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UNITED STATES CAPPER-VOLSTEAD ACT 
An Act to Authorize Association of Producers of Agricultural Products 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of 
America in Congress assembled, that persons engaged in the production of agricultural 
products as farmers, planters, ranchmen, dairymen, nut or fruit growers may act together 
in associations, corporate or otherwise, with or without capital stock, in collectively 
processing, preparing for market, handling, and marketing in interstate and foreign 
commerce, such products of persons so engaged. 
Such associations may have marketing agencies in common; and such associations and 
their members may make the necessary contracts and agreements to effect such 
purposes; Provided, however, That such associations are operated for the mutual benefit 
of the members thereof, as such producers, and conform to one or both of the following 
requirements: 
First. That no member of the association is allowed more than one vote because of the 
amount of stock or membership capital he may own therein, or, 
Second. That the association does not pay dividends on stock or membership capital in 
excess of 8 per centum per annum. 
And in any case to the following: 
Third. That the association shall not deal in the products of non-members to an amount 
greater in value than such as are handled by it for members. 
Section 2. That if the Secretary of Agriculture shall have reason to believe that any such 
association monopolizes or restrains trade in interstate or foreign commerce to such an 
extent that the price of any agricultural product is unduly enhanced by reason thereof, he 
shall serve upon such association a complaint stating his charge in that respect, to which 
complaint shall be attached, or contained therein, a notice of hearing, specifying a day 
and place not less than thirty days after the service thereof, requiring the association to 
show cause why an order should not be made directing it to cease and desist from 
monopolization or restraint of trade. 
An association so complained of may at the time and place so fixed show cause why such 
order should not be entered. The evidence given on such a hearing shall be taken under 
such rules and regulations as the Secretary of Agriculture may prescribe, reduced to 
writing, and made a part of the record therein. If upon such hearing the Secretary of 
Agriculture shall be of the opinion that such association monopolizes or restrains trade 
in interstate or foreign commerce to such an extent that the price of any agricultural 
product is unduly enhanced thereby, he shall issue and cause to be served upon the 
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association an order reciting the facts found by him, directing such association to cease 
and desist from monopolization or restraint of trade. 
On the request of such association or if such association fails or neglects for thirty days 
to obey such order, the Secretary of Agriculture shall file in the district court in the 
judicial district in which such association has its principal place of business a certified 
copy of the order and of all the records in the proceeding, together with a petition asking 
that the order be enforced, and shall give notice to the Attorney General and to said 
association of such filing. Such district court shall thereupon have jurisdiction to enter a 
decree affirming, modifying, or setting aside said order, or enter such other decree as the 
court may deem equitable, and may make rules as to pleadings and proceedings to be 
had in considering such order. The place of trial may, for cause or by consent of parties, 
be changed as in other causes. 
The facts found by the Secretary of Agriculture and recited or set forth in said order 
shall be prima facie evidence of such facts, but either party may adduce additional 
evidence. The Department of Justice shall have charge of the enforcement of such 
order. After the order is so filed in such district court and while pending for review 
therein, the court may issue a temporary writ of injunction forbidding such association 
from violating such order or any part thereof. The court may, upon conclusion of its 
hearing, enforce its decree by a permanent injunction or other appropriate remedy. 
Service of such complaint and of all notices may be made upon such association by 
service upon any officer or agent thereof engaged in carrying on its business, or on any 
attorney authorized to appear in such proceeding for such association, and such service 
shall be binding upon such association, the officers, and members thereof. 
Approved, February 18, 1922 
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Federal Order Milk Market 
November. 1990 Pool 
I. Minnesota-Wisconsin Price Series 
Jan, 1990 
Feb 
Mar 
Apr 
May 
Jun 
$13.94 
12.22 
12.02 
12.32 
12.78 
13.28 
Jul, 1990 
Aug 
Sep 
Oct 
Nov 
Dec 
II. Price Formula (Federal Order) 
A. Class I Diff. = $2.00; forward pricing is 2 months; 
M-W = basic formula price 
B. Class II/III = M-W price for current month. 
III. Market: i handlers; 4,900 producers 
$13.43 
13.09 
12.50 
10.48 
10.25 
November Class I price = $ _____ _ 
November Class II/III price = $ _____ _ 
Beatrice Carnation Darisold 
Pounds Milk Received 80 Mil Lbs 120 Mil Lbs 50 Mil Lbs 50 Mil Lbs 
Class I Usage 60 Mil Lbs 30 Mil Lbs 45 Mil Lbs 45 Mil Lbs 
Class I Utilization 
Market: 
Pounds Received (Producer Milk) 
Class I Usage 
3 
Class I Utilization 
Total Value of Pool 
Blend Price Per Cwt = Total Value of Pool 
Total Cwt. of Milk in Pool 
Blend Price = = $ _____ _ 
IV. Value of Handler Milk 
Note: The marketwide pool blend price is $12.80 per cwt. 
Allen Beatrice Carnation 
Class I 600,000 cwt. 300,000 cwt. 450,000 cwt. 
x S14.5Q x S14,5Q x $14.50 
$ $ $ 
Class II/III 200,000 cwt. 900,000 cwt. 50,000 cwt. 
x s10.25 S SlQ.25 x s10.25 
Total Value of 
Milk at Plant: $ $ $ 
Plant Utilization: 75% 25% 90% 
Total Value of 
Milk at Plant + 
Cwt. of Milk at Plant $ $ $ 
= Value of Handler 
Milk Per Cwt. 
V. Plant Obligation To Producer Settlement Fund 
__ <t per cwt. 
on 800,000 cwt. 
=$ __ _ 
Beatrice 
__ <t per cwt. 
on 1,200,000 cwt. 
=$ __ _ 
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Carnation 
__ <t per cwt. 
on 500,000 cwt. 
=$ __ _ 
Dari&old 
450,000 cwt. 
x $14,50 
$ 
50,000 cwt. 
x SlQ.25 
$ 
90% 
$ 
__ <t per cwt. 
on 500,000 cwt. 
=$ __ _ 
VI. Federal Milk Market Order has now accomplished its four key functions: 
A Established minimum class prices. 
B. Verified receipts and usage of milk at each plant. 
C. Determined a minimum blend price for the month. 
D. Operated the Producer-Settlement (Equalization) Fund. 
Milk Price Bargaining 
Note: Federal milk orders establish minimum class and blend prices each month. What 
is required in order to gain premiums over minimum prices? 
1. Bargaining Power - the ability to influence the terms of trade, especially price, in 
your favor. 
2. Source of Bargaining Power - Control of Supply 
a. Public - limiting the total amount of output through supply 
management/ quota mechanisms. 
b. Private/Cooperative - having control over most or all of the supply for a 
market, regardless of the amount of that supply. 
3. Limits on Bargaining Power 
A. Economic 
1. Law of Demand - substitution; consumer response 
2. Law of Supply - entry, expansion, delayed exit, inter-market 
shipments. 
B. Institutional 
1. Judicial interpretations of the Capper-Volstead Act (e.g., no 
predatory and coercive actions). 
2. Lack of access to milk processing facilities by some bargaining 
groups, i.e., no real ability to withhold. 
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3. Lack of cooperation among different producer bargaining groups in 
the market and among markets. 
4. The number of independent producers whose supply is not 
controlled by the bargaining agency. 
SUPERPOOL 
I. Assume: 
1. Same market 
2. Allen, Beatrice, and Carnation buy milk from the co-op and therefore are 
in the superpool. 
3. Darigold has independent producers and is not in the superpool. 
4. The premium prices over Federal order minimum prices charged by the 
superpool cooperative(s) are as follows: 
Class I = $1.00 per cwt. 
Class III = 10 cents per cwt. } 20 cents Class II = 40 cents per cwt. 
(These over-order premiums do not include a 15 cent per cwt. service 
charge to handlers on .all milk). 
5. One million dollars of the money in the super-pool is paid out to 
producers. The other money in the super-pool is paid out in competitive 
credits, uniform receiving credits, and other cooperative marketing costs. 
Lbs of milk in super-pool 
Lbs of Class I in super-pool 
Lbs of Class II/III in super-pool 
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Value of super-pool: 
__ pounds of Class I in superpool at $1.00 per cwt. = 
__ pounds of Class II/ill in superpool at 20 cents per cwt. = 
$ 
$ 
Total value of super-pool = $ 
Allocation of super-pool: 
- One million dollars to producers 
- $580,000 to cover marketing costs 
Over-order blend premium per cwt. = amount of money in super-pool to be paid out to 
producers + total pounds of milk in super-pool: 
$1,000,000 
= 40 cents per cwt. 
2,500,000 cwt. 
Producer pay price = Federal order blend $ ________ _ 
+ blend premium $ ________ _ 
Total $ ________ _ 
II. Situation of a Plant in the Superpool (Carnation) Versus a Plant Buying 
Independent Milk (Darigold) 
Note: 1. 
2. 
Both plants run the same volume and the same utilization. 
Both plants have kicked in the same amount ($640,000) to the 
Federal order producer-settlement fund. 
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Cost of Handler Milk: 
(1) Carnation (in superpool) 
450,000 cwt. Class Ix ($14.50 + $1.00) 
50,000 cwt. Class II/III ($10.25 + .20) 
Total 
Average cost for all milk at Carnation = 
(2) Dari~old (not in superpool) 
450,000 cwt. Class Ix $14.50 
50,000 cwt. Class II/III x $10.25 
= $ 6,975,000 
= $ 522,500 
$ 7,497,500 
$7.497.500 -----. 
500,000 cwt. =( $ 15.00/cwt.[ 
= $ 6,525,000 
= $ 512,500 
Now add 40¢ per cwt. on all 500,000 cwt. Why? = $ 200,000 
= $ 7,237,500 Total cost of Darigold milk 
Average cost for all milk at Darigold = $7.237.500 
500,000 cwt. =l $ 14.48 I 
QUESTIONS: 
1. How much cheaper is Darigold getting its milk than Carnation? 
Total Dollars _____ ; Dollars per cwt. ____ _ 
NOTE: THE $260,000 THAT DARIGOLD HAS AS A COST ADVANTAGE IS 
$260,000 THAT MILK PRODUCERS ARE NOT RECEIVING. THAT IS $53.00 IN 
THE AVERAGE MILK CHECK (4,900 PRODUCERS) THAT IS NOT BEING PAID. 
2. How do the producer pay prices at Carnation and Darigold compare? 
3. How can Darigold pay the same producer price and yet get its milk at $260,000 
per month or 52 cents per cwt. cheaper? 
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NOTE: 
1. Carnation is in the superpool and must pay the $1.00 per cwt. premium on 
its 90 percent Class I utilization and 20 cent premium on its 10 percent 
Class II/III utilization. The Carnation producers (as well as the Allen and 
Beatrice producers) get only the 54 percent Class I utilization that 
describes the superpool, plus the small amount of premium money on Class 
II/III milk, minus marketing costs. 
2. Darigold is not in the superpool and does not have to pay any over-order 
premium money. However, it does match the superpool pay price. Since 
the superpool is only 54 percent Class I, Darigold is able to pay an over-
order blend price that matches the 54 percent superpool utilization, but 
that ignores its own 90 uercent Class I utilization. 
At the same time, Carnation is paying the full Class I price on its 90 
percent Class I usage (plus the small premium on Class II/III milk), 
BUT since it is super-pooled in a 54 percent Class I superpool 
(along with Allen and Beatrice), Carnation's producers only get the 
54 percent, similar to traditional marketwide pooling in the Federal 
order. 
NOTE: It only rewards a plant such as Darigold to stay outside of the superpool 
(i.e., not buy its milk from the co-op if its plant utilization is higher than that of 
the superpool. Also, this price situation can only occur when (1) there are over-
order prices, and (2) a plant or plants in the market are not buying from the 
cooperative but are procuring milk independently. 
III. Higher Premium With Higher Co-operative Memberships 
With a substantial amount of milk being marketed independently, as reflected in 
the Darigold situation, the bargaining power of the cooperative is diminished 
because it does not have effective control of the supply in the market. As a 
result, the co-operative's over-order premium structure is limited to the modest 
premiums used in the example -- $1.00 on Class I; 40 cents on Class II; and 10 
cents on Class III. If the co-operative attempted to extract higher premiums, it 
would (a) put its own customers at a dis-advantage relative to their competitors, 
and (b) trigger other handlers to initiate independent procurement. 
If the Darigold producers chose to become affiliated with the co-operative 
bargaining apparatus, then the co-operative could become more 
ambitious/aggressive in establishing its premium schedule. The primary 
immediate limit on how high the cooperative could go in establishing premiums 
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would be that point where handlers would find an incentive to import milk from 
other regions. Other factors -- customer relations, effects on demand -- would 
also be modifying considerations. 
However, if .ID.Qfil of the producers in the market were in the bargaining 
apparatus, it is reasonable to conclude that the premium structure could be 
doubled. This would mean premiums as follows: 
Class I = $2.00 
Class II = .80 } .40 Class III = .20 
Since these premiums would be marketwide, including Darigold, they would 
generate monthly over-order pools as follows: 
180,000,000 lbs. Class I x $2.00 per cwt. 
120,000,000 lbs. Class II/III x .40 per cwt. 
Total 
= $3,600,000 
= 480,000 
$4,080,000 
The monthly super-pool would be valued at $4,080,000. Assume that marketing 
costs of $580,000 would be subtracted from the super-pool. This would leave 
$3,500,000 to be paid out to producers. 
1. The $3,500,000 pay-out compares favorably with the $1,000,000 pay-out in 
the "old" market situation (or the $1,200,000 when also counting the 
Darigold match). 
2. The $3,500,000 payout spread across the 300 million pounds of milk in the 
market would mean a blend premium of $1.17 per cwt. This compares 
favorably with the blend premium in the "old" market situation of 40 cents 
per cwt. 
3. The $260,000 that Darigold is not having to pay milk producers in the "old" 
market situation would be fully recovered (and more), and all processors 
would be placed on an~ milk price/milk cost basis. 
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CONCLUSION 
1. Organization is the key. Only milk producers themselves can make the 
organization decision. 
2. Supply and demand forces will continue to be the key determinants of the milk 
price. But organization can help tilt milk prices positively for producers. 
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